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Abstract
Philosophers have, it seems, been beguiled by contingencies of the
evolution of scientific language. These contingencies can obscure the
nature of theoretical shifts. Retention of a term can obscure a radical
theoretical shift, and abandonment of a term can obscure continuity
of theory. In this paper, I consider the cases of caloric and the lu-
miniferous ether, both of which are often taken to be unproblematic
cases of theoretical entities abandoned by subsequent theories. I in-
vite the reader to consider what we now might be saying were those
terms retained, and argue that this sheds light on the nature of the
theoretical shifts involved.
1 Introduction
In the controversies between scientific realists and anti-realists, it is
common for anti-realists to enlist episodes in which theoretical posits
once accepted by a scientific community came to be rejected, in service
of a meta-inductive argument for the conclusion that we should ex-
pect some, or most, or perhaps even all of what is currently accepted
to suffer the same fate. Realists, on the other hand, tend to stress
continuity across theory changes. In all of these discussions, certain
things tend to be taken for granted by both sides. Among these are:
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nineteenth-century theories of electromagnetism posited the existence
of an electromagnetic ether, which was abandoned in the twentieth-
century, and heat was once thought to consist of a fluid, called caloric,
now regarded as nonexistent.
About discussions of this sort, Howard Stein commented, in his
“Yes, but. . . Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism,”
For my part, I throw up my hands at this: Why should
we say that the old term “ether” failed to “refer”? — and
that the old term “atom” did “refer”? Why, that is, ex-
cept for the superficial reason that the word “atom” is still
used in text-books, the word “ether” not? — It would be
possible to do a lengthy dialectical number on this; but
in brief: our own physics teaches us that there is nothing
that has all the properties posited by nineteenth-century
physicists for the ether or for atoms; but that, on the
other hand, in both instances, rather important parts of
the nineteenth-century theories are correct. For instance,
so far as Poincare´’s conviction that momentum conserva-
tion must hold among the “particles” taken by themselves
is concerned, it is established now beyond a doubt that or-
dinary bodies do exchange momentum with “the ether” —
i.e., with the electromagnetic field; and even that this field
has to be regarded as the seat of a distribution of mass,
and as participating in gravitational interactions. The two
cases — that of the ether and that of atoms — are, in
my view, so similar, that the radical distinction made be-
tween them by the referential realists confirms in me the
antecedent suspicion that this concern for reference — and
associated with it, another Quinean motif, the concern for
what is called the “ontology” of theories — is a distraction
from what really matters (Stein, 1989, 56–57).
I share Stein’s dismay, and I suspect that philosophers—myself included—
have been beguiled by contingencies of the evolution of scientific lan-
guage.
I would dearly like to know what Stein would have written, had
he written that lengthy dialectical number. What I offer here is a
brief and humble dialectical number of my own. I find it useful to
consider what we might now be saying if certain contingent and some-
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what arbitrary choices of language had gone otherwise.1 There are, I
claim, nearby possible worlds in which the word caloric was adopted
by proponents of the kinetic theory of heat, and in which the word
ether survived the advent of special relativity and continues to be in
use today. Moreover, these are nearby possible worlds in which the
shifts in scientific thought, as far as substantive content of what was
accepted and what was rejected, occurred in exactly the same way as
they did in the actual world. In these alternate worlds, the content
of currently accepted science is exactly what it is in our world; these
worlds differ from ours only in terminological choices. Readers may
well at this point be skeptical of the claim that these are nearby pos-
sible worlds. I urge such readers to read on; the case for this claim
will be made in the following.
Moreover, there is something to be said for the terminological
choices made by our counterfactual counterparts, as they shed light on
the nature of the shifts that occurred. These shifts are traditionally
expressed in something like the following way.
1. Heat was formerly thought to be a substance, called caloric,
which flows from warmer bodies to cooler. The kinetic theory of
heat does away with caloric, locating heat in the kinetic energy
of molecules.
2. During the 19th century, electric and magnetic fields were thought
of as disturbances in a subtle, all-pervasive medium, called the
ether. Einstein, in 1905, showed the ether to be superfluous, and
it is now thought to be nonexistent.
If such well-established theoretical entities, central to well-established
scientific theories, can be abandoned, ask the proponents of the pes-
simistic meta-induction, what hope do we have that the theoretical
entities of our current theories will survive? A common realist re-
sponse is to argue that, contrary to what might have appeared at the
time, the posited entities were not essential to the empirical success
of those theories.
Common to the realist and anti-realist is the shared assumption
1My goal is not merely to emphasize the contingency of terminological shifts. This point
has made been before; see, in particular, Stanford (2015). My goal is, rather, to argue
that, in the two cases examined here, involving the abandonment of the terms “ether”
and “caloric,” the terminological shift has obscured the nature of the theoretical shift,
and to urge that consideration of how one might express things had these terms not been
abandoned affords a clearer view of what transpired.
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that, according to current science, caloric and the luminiferous ether
do not exist. This, in my opinion, concedes too much to the pes-
simist. It also distracts from what is, for me, the most interesting
issue: getting clear about what we do, and do not, agree about with
our predecessors. In place of the traditional expression of these shifts,
I offer the following.
1. Though we now know that caloric is not conserved, Carnot’s as-
sumption that it is conserved did not impair his reasoning about
it, because that reasoning had to do with circumstances in which
it is conserved.
2. What Einstein and Lorentz disagreed about was whether the
luminiferous ether has the sort of structure that permits one to
speak of motion with respect to it. According to Einstein, though
the properties of the ether may vary from point to point, locally
it is sufficiently homogeneous that talk of velocity with respect to
the ether does not make sense.
If these seem quixotic at the moment, read on; I will explain. But
first, a few words about what I am not doing in this paper.
There is a distressing tendency in philosophy of science to draw
sweeping conclusions from consideration of a small number of histori-
cal examples carefully selected to serve the author’s purpose. I am not
engaged in that activity. In particular, I am not attempting to make
predictions, based on an inductive argument, about what elements of
contemporary science will survive into the next century. If one were
to attempt seriously the project of meta-induction, and to try to esti-
mate, via enumerative induction, the percentage of currently accepted
propositions that will survive one hundred or two hundred years of fu-
ture scientific developments, one would first need a historical data-set
that could be regarded as an unbiased sample of previously accepted
propositions. I have no idea how one would go about constructing
an appropriate data-set, but it should be clear that the method of
selective anecdote that is too common in the philosophy of science
literature has no probative value whatsoever. An appearance of sup-
port can be produced for anything one desires, if one is allowed to be
selective about the evidence. The morals I draw will not be of the
meta-inductive sort.
I am also not making a merely Quinean point that “any state-
ment can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system.” If no qualifications (such as
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a requirement that one’s behaviour be consistent with an honest and
sincere endeavour to learn about the world) are introduced, then, cer-
tainly, one can do all sorts of things, including insisting on blatant
falsehoods in the face of evidence of their falsity. Neither Quine nor
anyone else has offered an argument that a serious researcher engaged
in a project of understanding the world can hold any statement true,
come what may. My aim is higher. I will argue that the terminolog-
ical choices to be considered in this paper could have been adopted
by a community of serious researchers engaged in a project of trying
to understand what there is in the world and what it is like. And,
indeed, each of the terminological choices that I will be describing has
been advocated by a serious researcher; it just so happens that the
proposed terminology did not catch on.
2 The luminiferous ether
From the 17th to the 19th centuries, the wave theory of light was
associated with the postulation of a subtle medium, the luminiferous
ether, thought of as the bearer of light waves. In the mid-nineteenth
century this was joined by an electromagnetic ether, the seat of electric
and magnetic fields. Faraday’s discovery in 1845 that the plane of
polarization of light can be rotated by a magnetic field requires that
there be interaction between magnetic fields and light waves (Faraday,
1846).
The notion of field that is suggested by Faraday’s work was de-
veloped by Maxwell. This occurs in three stages. In the first, “Fara-
day’s Lines of Force” (1858), Maxwell develops an analogy between the
equations of electrostatics and the flow of an incompressible fluid. At
this stage he explicitly disavows formulating a physical theory; the role
of these analogies are to “bring before the mind, in a convenient and
manageable form, those mathematical ideas which are necessary to the
study of the phenomena of electricity” (Maxwell 1858, 29; Niven 1890,
157). In the second, “On Physical Lines of Force,” (1861; 1862), fol-
lowing the lead of Kelvin (Thomson 1847), who exhibited an analogy
between equations of electromagnetism and equations of equilibrium of
an elastic solid, Maxwell presents a mechanical model on which mag-
netic fields are associated with molecular vortices in some medium,
with the magnetic field vectors pointing along the axes of the vortices.
The vortices resist compression and hence the collection of them acts
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as an elastic solid. Small, spherical particles are introduced as idle
wheels between neighbouring vortices; the motion of these particles
constitute an electric current in conductors. In dielectrics (considered
in Part III), these particles never venture far from their equilibrium
positions; under stress, they can be displaced slightly. When the stress
is relaxed, the electric particles return to their original position, and
this movement of electricity (the displacement current) is treated as
exactly equivalent to a current in conductors, and, crucially, generates
a magnetic field, just as a conduction current does. Maxwell concludes
that transverse vibrations can propagate through the elastic medium,
and estimates their velocity as equal to the ratio between electro-
magnetic and electrostatic units (which has dimension length/time),
recently measured by Kohlrausch and Weber as 310,740,000,000 mm.
per second. This agrees so closely with the speed of light in air, mea-
sured by Fizeau, that Maxwell declares that “we can scarcely avoid
the inference that light consists in the transverse undulations of the
same medium which is the cause of electric and magnetic phenomena”
(Maxwell 1862, 22; Niven 1890, 500).2
At this stage Maxwell takes the elastic medium to be a reality,
though he is not committed to the details of his somewhat baroque
mechanical model (he is confident, though, that magnetic fields are
associated with some sort of rotation of the medium). In his mature
theory, presented in “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic
Field” (1865) and his monumental Treatise on Electricity and Mag-
netism (1873a,b), he eschews mechanical models, presuming only that
in the space surrounding electric and magnetic bodies there is mat-
ter in motion, to which the methods of Lagrangian mechanics can be
applied. What we know about the electromagnetic field is the energy
associated with various states of the field. The Treatise concludes,
whenever energy is transmitted from one body to another
in time, there must be a medium or substance in which
the energy exists after it leaves one body and before it
reaches the other, for energy, as Torricelli remarked, ‘is a
2Maxwell’s calculation, in 1862, was based on consideration of his molecular-vortex
model, and involved some somewhat arbitrary assumptions about parameters of that
model. His conclusion that the velocity of transverse vibrations is equal to the ratio be-
tween electromagnetic and electrostatic units should be regarded as an order-of-magnitude
estimate (see Siegel 1991, Ch. 5, for details). The now-familiar derivation of a wave equa-
tion for the fields (Maxwell considers the magnetic field, but essentially the same derivation
goes through for the electric), is found in Part VI of Maxwell (1865).
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quintessence of so subtile a nature that it cannot be con-
tained in any vessel except the most inmost substance of
material things.’ Hence all these theories lead to a con-
ception of a medium in which the propagation takes place,
and if we admit this medium as an hypothesis, I think it
ought to occupy a prominent place in our investigations,
and that we ought to endeavour to construct a mental rep-
resentation of all the details of its action, and this has been
my constant aim in this treatise (Maxwell, 1873b, 438).
Those of us whose introduction to classical electromagnetic theory
occurred in either the 20th or 21st centuries, through the medium of
standard textbooks, are familiar with a picture according to which
charges are associated with ponderable matter, and are distinct from
electromagnetic fields.3 Currents are moving charges, on this picture,
and charges and currents bear a two-sided relation to the fields: they
act as sources of fields, and are acted upon by the fields via the Lorentz
force law. On this picture, the free-space fields E and B are primary,
and the “macroscopic” fields, D and H, are derived as averages over
regions large enough to contain a great many molecules, with which
may be associated electrical or magnetic moments.
This textbook classical electromagnetic theory, with a dualistic
ontology of charged matter and electromagnetic fields, and a delimi-
tation of scope according to which it is not the business of the theory
to explain the structure or stability of ponderable matter (so that
charges and currents as sources may be taken as exogenously given),
is a 20th century construction from 19th century materials. It does
not correspond to Maxwell’s conception of the theory, or to that of
his immediate successors.
Though it is clear that the now-familiar textbook picture is not
Maxwell’s view, what, precisely, he does think is not easy to glean
from his mature writings. Poincare´, in the introduction to his lectures
on electricity and optics, says, in regards to Maxwell’s Treatise,
One of the French scientists who has probed Maxwell’s
work the most deeply said to me one day, ‘I understand
everything in this book, except what is meant by a charged
sphere’ (quoted in translation by Bromberg 1968, 142, from
3For our purposes, we may take Jackson (1962) and subsequent editions as representa-
tive of the textbook tradition referred to. This has not only been a widely used text; its
method of exposition has influenced other textbooks.
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Poincare´ 1890, xvi-xvii).4
A modern reader may well share this puzzlement when encountering
locutions such as “free positive electricity . . . arises from the electrifi-
cation of the different parts of the field not neutralizing each other,”
(Maxwell 1865, 485; Niven 1890, 561) and, in §111 of the Treatise,
“According to this theory, all electrification is the residual effect of
the polarization of the dielectric,” (Maxwell, 1873a, 133) which be-
comes, in the second edition, “all charge is the residual effect of the
polarization of the dielectric” (Maxwell, 1881, 155).5
On Maxwell’s theory of electric displacement, an electric field in
the interior of a dielectric medium is realized as a strain in the medium,
which produces displacements of positive and negative electricity which,
in any region in which the displacement is constant, average to zero.
Where the displacement vector field has a nonzero divergence, there
will be within any small region a net charge, as more charge is dis-
placed out of it on one side than into on the other.
At the boundary between a dielectric and a conductor, there will
be a discontinuity in the displacement vector, and a net charge at the
surface. Crucially, this remains true when the boundary is a boundary
between ponderable matter and what we would think of as empty
space. What we think of as a vacuum, Maxwell regards as filled with
a polarizable dielectric medium, the ether.6
It was Lorentz who decisively located charge in “ponderable matter
perfectly permeable to the ether and able to move without commu-
nicating the least motion to the ether” (1892, 70).7 This is not only
a bold move, it is one of questionable consistency with other ideas.
Though the ether interacts with ponderable matter, exchanging en-
ergy with it, the latter communicates no motion to the ether. As Stein
(1978, 383) notes, Lorentz did not present this move as “revolution-
ary.” Nonetheless, Stein’s characterization of the move is apt.
What in effect he [Lorentz] did deserves comparison with
4Un des savants franc¸ais qui ont le plus approfondi l’oeuvre de Maxwell me disait un
jour : Je comprends tout dans son livre, excepte´ ce que c’est qu’une boule e´lectrise´. 
5Though the second edition of the Treatise was published posthumously, the first nine
chapters are based on Maxwell’s own revisions.
6See Bromberg (1968), Buchwald (1985, Ch. 3), Siegel (1991, 150-151), Darrigol (2000,
§4.4.8) for discussions of this point.
7See Hirosige (1969) for a detailed account of the development of this conception in
Lorentz’ work. The first step towards this conception is taken already in his dissertation,
(Lorentz, 1875), but it is not fully realized until 1895.
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such other cuttings of Gordian knots as that by Einstein
in his 1905 quantum paper and that by Bohr in his 1913
papers on the constitution of atoms and molecules: in his
quiet way, he had the boldness and the insight to combine
those parts of existing physical theory that could lead to
definite and interesting results, while ignoring—as in the
case of Einstein and Bohr, tentatively and in the spirit
of heuristic inquiry—what he saw no way to incorporate
consistently (Stein, 1978, 383).
Perhaps, after all, we should recognize Lorentz as a quiet
revolutionary (384).
In Lorentz’ version of electromagnetism, electromagnetic waves are
local disturbances in a stationary ether. The velocity implicit in
Maxwell’s equations, which is the velocity of freely propagating elec-
tromagnetic waves, is velocity with respect to this ether, as is the
velocity that appears in the Lorentz force law.
There is a substantial lacuna in Maxwell’s treatment of optical
phenomena, that may be surprising to modern readers. His treatment
of light is restricted to wave propagation in homogeneous media. Nei-
ther in the “Dynamical Theory” nor in the Treatise does he deal with
reflection and refraction of light at the boundary of two media with
differing indices of refraction. Thus, one will find in Maxwell no elec-
tromagnetic explanation of Fresnel’s laws of reflection and refraction,
which have become a centerpiece of the discussions surrounding struc-
tural realism. The stumbling block was the question of boundary
conditions to impose at the interface between the two media.8 This
problem was dealt with by Lorentz in his doctoral dissertation (1875;
1997). Lorentz was inspired by a remark made in a footnote in a paper
of Helmholtz, in which Helmholtz announced (without giving details)
that the laws of reflection and refraction hold at the boundary of two
insulating media when either the electric or magnetic polarisability of
the two media are the same (Helmholtz 1870, 68; 1882, 559). It was
also dealt with by Fitzgerald (1880), who adopted boundary condi-
tions from MacCullagh (1846).9 In his referee report on a draft of
Fitzgerald’s paper (Maxwell, 1879), Maxwell expressed dissatisfaction
with Fitzgerald’s treatment of boundary conditions, urging the author
8See Maxwell’s letter to Stokes, 15 October 1864, in Harman (1995, 186–188).
9See Stein (1981, 310–315) and Saatsi (2005) for discussion.
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to be more explicit about the physical assumptions made.10 Sadly,
Maxwell did not live to comment on the final version of Fitzgerald’s
paper.
It follows from Maxwell’s equations11 that, at a boundary surface
between two dielectrics, on which there may or may not be a surface
charge density and surface current density, the components of E tan-
gent to the surface, and the component of B normal to the surface,
must be continuous. If there is surface charge at the boundary, there is
a discontinuity in the component of D perpendicular to the surface as
it crosses the boundary, proportional to the surface charge density at
that point. If there are surface currents, there is a discontinuity in the
tangential components of H at the boundary, equal in magnitude to
the magnitude of the surface current density (see Appendix for proofs
of these assertions). In his dissertation, Lorentz imposes boundary
conditions that are equivalent to the continuity of the component of
D perpendicular to the surface and of the tangential component of H
at the boundary.12 These conditions are equivalent to the absence of
free surface charges or currents at the boundary. The modern text-
book tradition follows Lorentz in this (see Jackson 1962, §7.5).
From the point of view adopted by Lorentz and the textbook tra-
dition, which locates charges in ponderable matter rather than in the
electromagnetic field, one can simply stipulate that the situation at
hand is one in which surface charges are absent, and continuity of the
perpendicular component of D at the boundary follows from this as-
sumption. On Maxwell’s view of charge, continuity of D at the bound-
ary cannot be thought of as a consequence of an absence of charge at
the boundary, which one can impose as an exogenous constraint on the
problem. Rather, because a surface charge at the boundary is nothing
other than a discontinuity in the electric displacement D at that loca-
10“his statement of the boundary conditions. . . can only be interpreted by working back-
wards from his results.”
11In this paper, the term Maxwell’s equations is used according in conformity with
20th-century textbook tradition, for the familiar set of four equations relating electrical
and magnetic fields to each other and to source charges and currents. These equations
are, unsurprisingly, not those of Maxwell, who summarized the basic equations of electro-
magnetism in a set of 12 equations in which the electric and magnetic potentials figure
prominently (see Maxwell 1873b, Ch. IX). The first appearance of the basic equations of
Maxwellian electromagnetism written in terms of the fields directly occurs in Heaviside’s
“Electromagnetic Induction and its Propagation,” published in 1885; see Heaviside (1892,
Art. XXX).
12See Hirosige (1969, 168).
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tion, assuming absence of surface charge is precisely the assumption
of continuity at the boundary. This may help to explain why Maxwell
was at a loss to formulate physically well-motivated boundary con-
ditions at the interface between two dielectrics that would suffice to
obtain laws of reflection and refraction. The upshot of this is that
it is misleading to say that Fresnel’s laws of reflection and refraction
follow from Maxwell’s theory. They follow from Lorentz’s transfigured
version of Maxwell’s theory.
The next step, from Lorentz’s reformulation, towards the mod-
ern view, is well-known. Einstein, dissatisfied with the fact that, in
the analysis of certain phenomena, such as induction of current in a
conductor moving with respect to a magnet, there is an asymmetry in
the theoretical treatment that does not appear in the phenomena—the
theoretical treatment differs, depending on which bodies are moving
with respect to the ether, whereas the observable phenomena depend
only on the relative motion of ponderable bodies—reformulates elec-
tromagnetic theory in a way that makes no use of the motion of bodies
with respect to the ether, and declares,
The introduction of a “light ether” will prove superfluous,
inasmuch as in accordance with the concept to be devel-
oped here, no “space at absolute rest” endowed with spe-
cial properties will be introduced, nor will a velocity vector
be assigned to a point of empty space at which electromag-
netic processes are taking place (Einstein 1989, 141, from
Einstein 1905, 892).
This is the first clear articulation of the modern view of electromag-
netic fields as self-subsistent in otherwise empty space. It would not
have been possible on Maxwell’s theory, as, on that theory, to do away
with the elastic medium that is the seat of electromagnetic fields would
be to do away with the charges on the surface of a charged conductor.
The transition from ether-based theories to a view on which elec-
tromagnetism deals with free-standing fields in otherwise empty space
is, in the literature on structural realism, referred to in a way that
strikes me as misleading. It is almost universally referred to as the
“Fresnel-Maxwell” transition. This locution stems from Worrall.
Fresnel’s wave theory itself was soon replaced by Maxwell’s
electromagnetic theory. Maxwell, as is well known, strove
manfully to give an account of the electromagnetic field
in terms of some underlying mechanical medium; but his
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attempts and those of others failed and it came to be ac-
cepted that the electromagnetic field is a primitive. So
again a fundamental change in the accepted account of the
basic structure of light seems to have occurred — instead
of vibrations carried through an elastic medium, it became
a series of wave-like changes in a disembodied electromag-
netic field. A mechanical vibration and an electric (‘dis-
placement’) current are surely radically different sorts of
thing (Worrall, 1989, 108).
Maxwell’s theory and then the General Theory of Relativity
entail that there is just no such thing as Fresnel’s elastic
optical ether. According to these later theories, light “in
fact” consists of vibrations of the electromagnetic field, a
field which is“sui generis”, explicitly not a manifestation
of the contortions of some underlying material medium.
(As is well known, Maxwell himself tried hard to produce
a “mechanical model” for the field—that is, to explain the
field in terms of some underlying material medium. But his
failure in this attempt, and the failure of his contemporaries
and successors, led to the acceptance of what might be
called the “mature” version of Maxwell’s theory—a theory
that sees the field as a “primitive” part of the furniture of
the universe.) (Worrall, 1994, 335)
Now, although there is a sense in which what emerged from the work
of Lorentz and then Einstein was a maturation of Maxwell’s theory, to
say that it is Maxwell’s theory that entails that there is no elastic op-
tical ether is to disregard the transformation of the theory, in Lorentz’
hands, that was required to pave the way for Einstein’s declaration
that the ether is superfluous, a quarter-century after Maxwell’s un-
timely death. And to refer to a conception of electromagnetic fields
that was first articulated in the 20th century, and which is completely
alien to Maxwell’s conception, as Maxwell’s theory, in articles that will
be read by students who are unfamiliar with the actual history but in
whom we are trying to inculcate a respect for actual history, strikes
me as a poor choice.
The story, as told in the scientific realism literature, also omits
the further development of Einstein’s thinking. As we have seen, in
1905 Einstein declared the ether to be superfluous. By 1920 he was
expressing things differently. In an address delivered in May, 1920, at
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the University of Leiden (with Lorentz present), Einstein says,
He [Lorentz] achieved this, the most important advance
in the theory of electricity since Maxwell, by taking from
ether its mechanical, and from matter its electromagnetic
qualities. As in empty space, so too in the interior of mate-
rial bodies, the ether, and not matter viewed atomistically,
was exclusively the seat of electromagnetic fields. Accord-
ing to Lorentz the elementary particles of matter alone are
capable of carrying out movements; their electromagnetic
activity is confined to the carrying of electric charges. Thus
Lorentz succeeded in reducing all electromagnetic happen-
ings to Maxwell’s equations in free space.
As to the mechanical nature of the ether, it may be said of
it, in a somewhat playful spirit, that immobility is the only
mechanical property of which it has not been deprived by
H. A. Lorentz. It may be added that the whole change in
the conception of the ether which the special theory of rela-
tivity has brought about, consisted in taking away from the
ether its last mechanical property, namely, its immobility
(Einstein 1922, 10-11, from Einstein 1920, 7).
On this way of expressing the matter, the transition to special relativ-
ity consisted in the realization that the remaining mechanical property
ascribed to it, immobility, actually played no role in electromagnetic
theory.
The next position which it is possible to take up in the
face of this state of things [that is, the lack of an empirical
distinction between rest and uniform motion with respect
to the ether] appeared to be the following. The ether does
not exist at all. The electromagnetic fields are not states
of a medium, and are not bound down to any bearer, but
they are independent realities which are not reducible to
anything else, exactly like the atoms of ponderable matter
(Einstein 1922, 12, from Einstein 1920, 8).
This, of course, is Einstein’s view as of 1905. But it is not his final
view.
More careful reflection teaches us, however, that the special
theory of relativity does not compel us to deny ether. We
may assume the existence of an ether; only we must give up
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ascribing a definite state of motion to it, i.e., we must take
from it the last mechanical characteristic which Lorentz
had left it (Einstein 1922, 13, from Einstein 1920, 9).
Later, Einstein wrote, “Today his [Lorentz’s] discovery may be ex-
pressed as follows: physical space and the ether are only different
terms for the same thing; fields are physical states of space” (Einstein
1954, 281, from Einstein 1934).
Einstein is right about this, I think, though Lorentz himself did not
agree. The move made by Lorentz, of locating charges and currents
in ponderable matter and assigning to the ether no other role than
as seat of electromagnetic fields, does make “ether” merely another
word for space devoid of ponderable matter. The remaining point
of disagreement between them had to do with the structure of this
ether—does it possess the sort of structure that permits one to speak
unambiguously of motion with respect to it?
To describe, as is common in the historical literature on this topic,
Lorentz as an ether theorist and to take Einstein as having shown the
ether to be superfluous obscures both the revolutionary move made by
Lorentz and the continuity between Einsteinian and Lorentzian elec-
trodynamics. To describe, as is common in the literature on structural
realism, the Einstein 1905 view as a “mature” version of Maxwell’s
theory also obscures the distance between Maxwell and Lorentz on
this matter. Things become clearer if we describe the progression of
ideas as Einstein recommends. Lorentz strips the ether of all “me-
chanical” properties besides providing a standard of rest and motion;
Einstein showed that it doesn’t even play that role, as (contrary to
first appearances), state of motion with respect to the ether plays no
essential role in electromagnetic theory.
3 Caloric
Among the entries in Lavoisier’s Table of Simple Substances in his
Traite´ E´le´mentaire de Chimie is calorique, or caloric, which he re-
gards as identical to what other writers had referred to variously as
heat, principle of heat, fire, igneous fluid, or matter of fire and heat
(Lavoisier 1789, 192; 1790, 175). It is difficult, Lavoisier says, to con-
ceive of the effects of heat on matter “without admitting them as the
effects of a real and material substance, or a very subtle fluid, which,
insinuating itself between the particles of bodies, separates them from
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each other; and, even supposing the existence of this fluid to be hy-
pothetical, we shall see in the following that it explains all of the
phenomena of nature in a very satisfactory manner” (1790, 4, from
Lavoisier 1789, 4).13
On the traditional story, a rival theory, the kinetic theory of heat,
according to which heat is not a substance contained in hot bodies
but rather, subsists in the kinetic energy of molecules making up those
bodies, gradually gained ascendance. Instrumental in the transition
were Count Rumford’s experiments concerning the generation of heat
by friction. Rumford argued that what his experiments showed was
that there was no limit to the heat that might be obtained from a
given body via friction. Also instrumental in the shift in the con-
ception of the nature of heat were Joule’s experiments, in the 1840s,
on the mechanical equivalent of heat. Expenditures of equal amounts
of mechanical energy produce equal amounts of heat, as measured by,
say, the increase of temperature produced in a given quantity of water.
This permits heat to be measured in terms of its mechanical equiva-
lent; we would now say that both heat and work can be measured in
terms of energy. The interconvertibility of heat and work became a
cornerstone of the science of thermodynamics.
The second cornerstone of the developing science of thermody-
namics was Carnot’s analysis of the efficiency of heat engines. In the
familiar textbook presentation, a reversible engine is considered that
operates between two heat reservoirs. The engine is operated in a cy-
cle that involves extraction of an amount of heat Q1 from the hotter
reservoir, part of which is converted into work W , with the remain-
der, Q2, deposited into the colder reservoir. Conservation of energy
requires
Q1 = W +Q2. (1)
We can define the efficiency of the engine as the proportion of the heat
extracted from the hotter reservoir that is converted into work.
η =
W
Q1
=
Q1 −Q2
Q1
. (2)
13 It should be noted that Lavoisier was not dogmatic about the nature of caloric; “we
are not obliged to suppose this to be a real substance; it being sufficient, as will be more
clear in the following, that it be considered as the repulsive cause, whatever that may be,
which separates the particles of matter from each other, so that we are still at liberty to
investigate its effects in an abstract and mathematical manner” (1790, 5–6, from Lavoisier
1789, 5–6).
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Those who are familiar with this presentation may be puzzled to learn
that Carnot regarded heat as a conserved fluid, and took it as ax-
iomatic that the same amount of heat is deposited into the colder
reservoir as is extracted from the hotter. Kelvin himself, at the time
he wrote the paper in which he first introduced an absolute tempera-
ture scale, shared this assumption.
In the present state of science no operation is known by
which heat can be absorbed, without either elevating the
temperature of matter, or becoming latent and producing
some alteration in the physical condition of the body into
which it is absorbed; and conversion of heat (or caloric) into
mechanical effect is probably impossible*, certainly undis-
covered (Thomson 1848, 68, in Thomson 1882, 102. See
also Thomson 1849, in Thomson 1882, 117).
Occurring in an article that contains an analysis of the Carnot cycle,
the assertion that there is no known process by which heat is converted
to mechanical effect is likely to seem puzzling to modern readers.
The solution to the puzzle can be found by considering how quan-
tity of heat is to be determined. The now-standard analysis is predi-
cated on taking the quantities of heat Q1 and Q2 to be measured by
their mechanical equivalents, which, as Joule demonstrated to many
researchers’ satisfaction, agrees with heat as measured by calorimetric
methods. That is, Q1 and Q2 are the amounts of energy transferred
in the two heat exchanges of the engine with the reservoirs.
That this is the appropriate measure of quantity of caloric is not
something that ought to be taken for granted, in the context of Carnot’s
account of the motive power of heat. According to him, the motive
power of a given quantity of caloric is a function of temperature. In a
famous analogy, he compares the motive power of heat to the motive
power of water, which is a function of height.
The motive power of a waterfall depends on the height and
the quantity of the liquid; the motive power of heat de-
pends also on quantity of caloric used, and on what may
be termed, on what in fact we will call, the height of its
fall [la hauteur de sa chute], that is to say, the difference of
temperature of the bodies between which the exchange of
caloric is made. (Carnot 1890, 61, from Carnot 1824, 28;
see also Magie 1899, 16).
Though the concept would not be fully developed for another decade
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or so, we can see that Carnot here has a glimmering of the concept we
now call potential energy. When water falls from a height, turning
a wheel, the quantity of water is not diminished, but some of its
potential energy is converted into mechanical energy. Carnot sees
the action of heat to be analogous; in a heat engine, a quantity of
caloric is taken from a higher temperature to a lower temperature,
and it thereby loses some of its motive power, as some of this motive
power is converted into mechanical effect.
We thus see that, on this way of viewing things, there is a potential
ambiguity in the phrase “quantity of heat.” When heat passes from
one body to another, a quantity of caloric is exchanged, and with it
a temperature-dependent quantity of energy. Either of these might
be called “quantity of heat.” Let us see what follows from taking
seriously the notion that quantity of caloric may be distinct from the
quantity of energy associated with it.
If we take the transfer of motive power (heat energy) associated
with a quantity of caloric transferred between two bodies of equal tem-
perature T to be an extensive quantity (so that doubling the quantity
of caloric transferred at that temperature doubles the transfer of mo-
tive power), then the motive power, Q, of a quantity C of caloric at
temperature T will be given by,
Q = CF (T ), (3)
where F (T ) is a function of temperature. If we have a process in
which a quantity C of caloric is withdrawn from a reservoir at tem-
perature T1, with energy content Q1 = CF (T1), followed by cooling of
the working substance to a lower temperature T2 and deposit of the
same quantity C of caloric, with energy content Q2 = CF (T2), into a
reservoir at temperature T2, we must have
F (T1)
F (T2)
=
Q1
Q2
, (4)
and, for the work developed by the engine,
W = C(F (T1)− F (T2)). (5)
The function F that appears in (3) will, of course, depend on the
temperature scale used. It was Kelvin’s insight to realize that the fact
that the maximum achievable efficiency of a heat engine operating
between two reservoirs at temperatures T1 and T2 depends only on the
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temperatures can be used to define a natural, or absolute, temperature
scale. We can define the ratio of the absolute temperature of the colder
bath to the temperature of the hotter bath by
T2
T1
= 1− η = Q2
Q1
, (6)
where η is the efficiency of a reversible engine operating in a cycle
between the two reservoirs, as defined in (2), and Q1 and Q2 are the
quantities of heat energy withdrawn from, and deposited into, the
hotter and colder reservoirs by the reversible engine. By Carnot’s
principle, it does not matter what reversible engine is considered.
When temperature is measured on the absolute scale, the function
F appearing in equation (3) takes a particularly simple form.
F (T ) ∝ T, (7)
which gives us, for the heat energy Q associated with a quantity C of
caloric transferred at temperature T ,
Q ∝ CT. (8)
Thus, the work developed by a fall of a quantity C of caloric from a
temperature T1 to a lower temperature T2 is
W ∝ C(T1 − T2). (9)
We can choose units for C, the quantity of caloric, that make the
proportionality constant equal to unity. Thus we have that, when a
quantity C of caloric is transferred between bodies at absolute tem-
perature T , there is an associated transfer of heat energy
Q = CT. (10)
All we have assumed, in order to obtain the result (10), is:
I. The heat energy associated with a quantity of caloric at a given
temperature is an extensive quantity.
II. Caloric content is a function of the thermodynamic state of a sys-
tem, so that, when a system undergoes a cyclic process, restoring
at the end of the process its initial thermodynamic state, its ini-
tial caloric content is thereby restored.
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III. Conservation of energy; the work developed by the engine is
equal to the difference between the heat energy extracted from
the hotter reservoir and the heat energy deposited into the cooler
reservoir.
These assumptions suffice to yield the relation (10), up to an irrel-
evant multiplicative constant. The relation can, of course, be inverted.
When a quantity Q of heat energy is transferred between two bodies
at absolute temperature T , there is a transfer of a quantity of caloric
equal to
C =
Q
T
. (11)
Given the assumptions I–III, we obtain (up to an irrelevant multi-
plicative constant) (11) as the quantity of caloric transferred between
two bodies at equal temperatures, when a quantity Q of heat energy
is transferred via a thermodynamically reversible process.
Carnot himself derives the conclusion that F (T ) is proportional
to T , for the special case of an ideal gas, and under the assumption
that specific heat of a gas is independent of temperature and vol-
ume.14 There is a wrinkle, however. Carnot also takes the measure
of a quantity of heat (caloric) to be its calorimetric measure; we may
measure a quantity of heat by the temperature change it produces in
some quantity of water, or by the quantity of ice that it will melt (see
Carnot 1824, 15; 1890, 50; Magie 1899, 9). It is now taken to be a
well-established fact that quantity of heat, as measured calorimetri-
cally, is proportional to its energy content Q, with a proportionality
independent of the substance in which the heat inheres and of the
temperature of the bodies between which the heat is transferred. This
would mean that, contrary to Carnot’s assumption, the energy con-
tent (motive power) of a quantity of heat (measured calorimetrically)
does not depend on temperature.
If we accept that the motive power (energy content) of a quantity
(measured calorimetrically) of heat transferred in a thermodynami-
cally reversible process is independent of temperature, and not (as
Carnot thought) something that increases with temperature, then we
have a decision to make. We can maintain that quantity of caloric is
its calorimetric measure, and accept that caloric is not conserved in
a Carnot cycle and that some of it is converted to mechanical work.
14This is in a footnote to the main text; see Carnot (1824, 73–79), Carnot (1890, 244–
251), Magie (1899, 39–42).
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Or we can take (11) as a theory-dependent measure of the quantity
of caloric transferred when a quantity of heat energy is transferred
between two bodies at the same temperature. This is a terminological
choice. There is something to be said for the latter choice, as it helps
us see why the assumption that caloric is conserved in a Carnot cycle
does no harm; if quantity of caloric is given by (11), it is conserved in
a Carnot cycle.
This definition of caloric content deals with transfers of caloric be-
tween bodies at equal temperature via thermodynamically reversible
processes. As the caloric content of a system is taken to be a state
function, the definition can be extended to changes in caloric content
via irreversible transitions, provided that the initial and final states
can be connected by some reversible process. Given a process that be-
gins in a thermodynamic state a and ends in a thermodynamic state
b, we can consider a reversible process connecting the two states (it
follows from the second law of thermodynamics that it won’t matter
which reversible process we consider), and apply the definition (11).
This has the consequence that total quantity of caloric in all bod-
ies involved in a process is conserved only in thermodynamically re-
versible processes. In irreversible processes, caloric is generated. This
may seem to some readers to strain the notion of caloric beyond the
breaking point. I can only say, in defense of this locution, that at
least one researcher, Kelvin himself, was willing to countenance the
possibility of generating caloric, in his initial reaction to Joule’s ex-
periments. In a footnote appended to the word “impossible” in the
above-quoted passage, he writes
* This opinion [of the impossibility of conversion of heat
into mechanical effect] seems to be very nearly universally
held by those who have written on the subject. A con-
trary opinion however has been advocated by Mr Joule of
Manchester ; some very remarkable discoveries which he
has made with reference to the generation of heat by the
friction of fluids in motion, and some known experiments
with magneto-electric machines, seeming to indicate an ac-
tual conversion of mechanical effect into caloric. No exper-
iment however is adduced in which the converse operation
is exhibited; but it must be confessed that as yet much is
involved in mystery with reference to these fundamental
questions of natural philosophy (Thomson 1848, 68; 1882,
102).
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On this view, caloric may be generated by expenditure of mechani-
cal work, but, once generated, cannot be destroyed. Acceptance of
this view requires that one take (11) as correctly furnishing the quan-
tity of caloric associated with transfer of heat energy Q at absolute
temperature T .
The traditional account of the shift from caloric theory to the
kinetic theory of heat might lead one to expect the quantity that we
have been calling caloric content, defined by (11), to play no role in
the theorizing of the kinetic theorists. An unsubtle wielding of the
traditional realist response to the pessimistic meta-induction might
involve an attempt to argue that quantity of caloric C, so defined, is
a wheel turning idly in the theory, with all the essential work done
by the quantity of heat energy Q. As the astute reader has already
realized, nothing could be further from the truth!
The quantity, Q/T , was recognized by the kinetic theorists who
were developing the nascent science of thermodynamics as a signif-
icant quantity. Clausius (1854) designated it the equivalence-value
(Aequivalenzwerth) of the heat transferred. By 1865 he had decided
that it required a more dignified name.
If we look for a designation for S, one might, in analogy
to saying that the quantity U is the body’s heat and work
content, say of the quantity S that it is the transforma-
tional content of the body. But since I think it better to
take the names of such important scientific quantities from
ancient languages, so that they can be used unchanged in
all modern languages, I propose that S be called according
to Greek words, ἡ τρωpiὴ, transformation, the entropy of
the body. The word entropy was deliberately formed to be
as similar as possible to the word energy, because the two
magnitudes which are to be named by these words are so
closely related to one another in their physical meanings,
that a certain similarity in the designation seems to me
to be appropriate (from Clausius 1865, 390; cf. Clausius
1867c, 357).15
15Sucht man fu¨r S einen bezeichnenden Namen, so ko¨nnte man, a¨hnlich wie von der
Gro¨sse U gesagt ist, sie sei der Wa¨rme- und Werkinhalt des Ko¨rpers, von der Gro¨sse sagen,
sie sei der Verwandlungsinhalt des Ko¨rpers. Da ich es aber fu¨r besser halte, die Namen
derartiger fu¨r die Wissenschaft wichtiger Gro¨ssen aus den alten Sprachen zu entnehmen,
damit sie unvera¨ndert in allen neuen Sprachen angewandt werden ko¨nnen, so schlage ich
vor, die Gro¨sse S nach dem griechischen Worte ἡ τρωpiὴ, die Verwandlung, die Entropie des
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In my alternate history, Clausius’ neologism fails to catch on, and, in
deference to tradition (or perhaps the principle that there is no point
in inventing a new word when there is a perfectly serviceable ready-
made one), the word caloric is used for the Aequivalenzwerth of heat.
The inhabitants of this alternate world take, as one formulation of the
second law of thermodynamics, the principle that caloric, once gener-
ated, is never destroyed. They do not, of course, agree with Carnot
in all respects. They don’t think of caloric as a substance, but they
rightly regard this a completely inessential aspect of the theoretical
shift from Carnot of 1824 to their own. Their chief substantive differ-
ence with Carnot 1824 has to do with the conservation of caloric, but
they acknowledge that, though Carnot was mistaken in thinking that
the total quantity of caloric is constant, this does not affect his rea-
soning because quantity of caloric is conserved in thermodynamically
reversible processes. Whether the caloric content of a body is thought
of as the quantity of some substance contained in the body or is re-
alized in some more subtle manner they rightly—and in agreement
with Lavoisier16—regard as irrelevant to any serious point of physical
theory.
I am not the first to have thought along these lines; the same pro-
posal, arrived at by much the same reasoning, was presented by Hugh
Longbourne Callendar, in his Presidential Address to the Physical
Society of London, on February 10, 1911. Callendar writes,
it was inevitable that caloric would make its reappearance
sooner or later in the mechanical theory. It first appears,
disguised as a triple integral, in Kelvin’s solution (“Phil.
Mag.” IV., p. 305, 1852) of the problem of finding the work
attainable from an unequally heated body. The solution (as
corrected later) is equivalent to the statement that the total
quantity of caloric remains constant when the equalisation
of temperature is effected by means of reversible engines.
Caloric reappears next as the “thermodynamic function”
of Rankine, and as the “equivalence-value of a transforma-
tion” of Clausius (“Pogg. Ann.,” XCIII., p. 497, 1854).
Finally, in 1865, when its importance was more fully recog-
Ko¨rpers zu nennen. Das Wort Entropie habe ich absichtlich dem Wort Energie mo¨glichst
a¨hnlich gebildet, denn die beiden Gro¨ssen, welche durch diese Worte benannt werden
sollen, sind ihren physikalischen Bedeutungen nach einander so nahe verwandt, dass eine
gewisse Gleichartigkeit in der Benennung mir zweckma¨ssig zu sein scheint.
16See quotation in footnote 13, above.
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nised, Clausius (“Pogg. Ann.,” CXXV., p. 390) gave it the
name of “entropy,” and defined it as the integral of dQ/T .
This definition depends on the calorimetric or energy mea-
sure of heat, and obscures the fact that the caloric measure
of heat follows directly from Carnot’s principle, and may
be made independent of the calorimetric measure. No one
at that time appears to have appreciated Carnot’s solu-
tion, or to have realised that entropy was merely caloric
under another name. In justice to Carnot, it should be
called caloric, and should be defined directly by means of
his equation W = AQ(T−T0).17 This method of procedure
appears to be justifiable both logically and historically, and
leads to a more practical and definite conception of entropy
or caloric as the true measure of a quantity of heat as op-
posed to a quantity of thermal energy (Callendar, 1910,
178).
The viability of interpreting Carnot’s quantity of caloric as entropy
was the subject of an exchange in the pages of the American Journal
of Physics between Victor Kuhn La Mer and Thomas S. Kuhn (La
Mer 1954, Kuhn 1955a, La Mer 1955, Kuhn 1955b). Unfortunately,
much of the discussion revolved around La Mer’s hyperbolic sugges-
tion that an interpretation of Carnot consistent with the modern view
can be obtained by consistently translating his “calorique” as “en-
tropy” and “chaleur” as “heat” (Kuhn is correct that Carnot does not
consistently distinguish calorique and chaleur in the manner required
for this translation to go through).
4 A matter of substance?
In my alternate history, we still speak of the ether, but, with Einstein,
regard it as synonymous with space devoid of ponderable matter. We
speak of caloric, but we understand what our German colleagues mean
when they occasionally use Clausius’ neologism Entropie. This is not
to say that our conception of the ether is to be identified with any
of the various ideas of the ether that were employed in 19th-century
optical and electromagnetic theory, or to say that our conception of
17Callendar’s Q is quantity of caloric, which is our C. In this equation, W is the work
obtained from a quantity of caloric via a fall of temperature from T to T0. This equation
is, therefore, equivalent to our eq. (9).
23
caloric is to be identified with Lavoisier’s or Carnot’s or any 18th-
or 19th-century writer. Lavoisier’s conception of caloric is predicated
on a conception of gases that extends the macroscopic quiescence of
a gas in equilibrium to the molecular level; on Lavoisier’s view, the
molecules of a gas remain at constant distances from each other, and
the role of caloric is to keep them that way, overcoming their natural
attraction for each other. For Lavoisier, caloric is “the repulsive cause,
whatever that may be, which separates the particles of matter from
each other.” We, on the other hand, reject the presupposition of this;
we don’t think that the molecules of a gas are kept separated from
each other, except on average.
To some readers, no doubt, there will seem to be a deep gulf be-
tween the older notions of caloric and the one suggested here (which
is compatible with the kinetic theory of heat), and between the older
notions of ether and the one suggested here (which is compatible with
the special and general theories of relativity), to the extent that they
will balk at extending the use of the terms in this way. If we attempt
to articulate the nature of this supposed gulf, there is, it seems, a
natural and simple way to characterize it. On the older conceptions,
caloric was conceived of as a substance. Adoption of the kinetic theory
of heat requires rejection of caloric as a substance. The quantity that,
in this context, may be called either quantity of caloric or entropy, in-
dicates, not the quantity of some substance that a body contains, but
rather, something about the body’s internal configuration. Similarly,
ether, if Einstein’s suggestion is to be followed, is not, as Fresnel and
Maxwell and Lorentz conceived it, an all-pervasive substance.
I must admit I share this intuition.18 We should ask whether this
intuition can form the basis of a considered judgment. If we express the
difference between caloric, as conceived of by Lavoisier, and entropy,
as we conceive it, by saying that the latter is not a substance, what
conception of substance are we employing to make this judgment?
One reason that this is a serious question is that those who were
converted to the kinetic theory of heat by experiments involving the
generation of heat by mechanical means employed inferences that we
might not be willing to endorse. We repeatedly find rejections of
the theory of heat as a substance based on a presupposition that, if
heat is a substance, its quantity is conserved. So, for example, Count
Rumford,
18When I say we have an intuition, I hope it is clear that I do not mean to indicate a
source of a priori knowledge, but rather, to flag a potential obstacle to clear thinking.
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What is heat?—Is there any such thing as an igneous fluid?—
Is there any thing that can with propriety be called caloric?
. . . in reasoning on this subject, we must not forget to con-
sider that most remarkable circumstance, that the source
of the heat generated by friction, in these experiments, ap-
peared evidently to be inexhaustible.
It is hardly necessary to add, that any thing which any
insulated body, or system of bodies, can continue to furnish
without limitation, cannot possibly be a material substance:
and it appears to me to be extremely difficult, if not quite
impossible, to form any distinct idea of any thing, capable
of being excited, and communicated, in the manner the
heat was excited and communicated in these experiments,
except it be motion (Thompson, 1798, 98–99).
If it is a necessary condition for something to be a material substance
that it cannot be generated in unlimited quantities, given unlimited
quantities of mechanical energy, then, by the lights of 20th-century
physics, there are no material substances.
The basic picture guiding most of the 18th- and 19th- century dis-
cussions was this. The world is composed of a finite number of simple
substances, whose quantity was fixed at the moment of creation and
will persist until the end of days. Composites consist of arrangements
of these simple substances, and all change consists of changes in these
arrangements. This is a picture that has been rejected by 20th-century
physics. One option we have is to say that we do not think that en-
tropy is a substance in the sense meant by caloric theorists because
we do not think that there are any substances in that sense. But this
makes the thesis trivial. I leave it an open question, for the reader
to consider, as to what, if any, notion of substance might serve to
underwrite the thesis without trivializing it.
5 Conclusion
If one examines the history of electromagnetic theory or of the the-
ory of heat prior to the twentieth century, one thing that presents
itself most forcefully is that there was never a settled and agreed-
upon body of theory. At any time there were multiple theories, none
of which could be taken as a final, completely adequate theory. And,
as concepts such as “caloric” and “ether” are theory-dependent, there
25
was never a settled conception of these. These were times of theories
and concepts in flux. For this reason, I do not regard it as a well-posed
question to ask whether we should take the words “caloric” or “ether”,
as used by 19th-century authors, as referring. We should decide what
we believe the world to be like, and, insofar as this conception dif-
fers from 19th-century conceptions, we have a choice of whether to
continue to employ older terminology or adopt new coinages.
As I said in the outset, there is a tendency to be beguiled by con-
tingent matters of retention and non-retention of terms. The fact that
Lorentz continued to speak of “ether” obscures the revolutionary na-
ture of the move that he made, a crucial one for the creation of the
subject that, in 20th-century textbooks, solidified as “classical elec-
trodynamics.” The fact that Einstein in 1905 rejected the ether as
superfluous obscures the extent of the continuity between his thought
and Lorentz’s. Einstein in later years tried to remedy this fault, with
(sadly, in my opinion) little effect on the way we talk about the tran-
sition from 19th- to 20th-century electromagnetic theory.
The fact that converts to the kinetic theory of heat rejected the
use of the word “caloric” (which had previously been taken as more
or less synonymous with “heat”) while retaining the word “heat” is
also, in my opinion, unfortunate. As a result of this, we continue to
talk of heat flow between bodies, and, then, we have to explain to
our students that we don’t thereby mean a increase in heat content of
the receiving body and decrease of heat content of the transmitting
body, and that it makes no sense to speak of the heat content of a
body, as energy that enters a body as heat may leave it as work, and
vice versa. Though heat content of a body is not a function of its
thermodynamic state, caloric content, as we have defined it, is a state
function. We would be much better off, and have fewer occasions to
explain to our students that we don’t mean what our words suggest,
if we had retained the term caloric and abandoned the word heat.
6 Appendix: Boundary conditions for
electric and magnetic fields
The demonstration that Fresnel’s laws of reflection and refraction fol-
low from Maxwell’s equations has become a textbook staple; see, e.g.
Jackson (1962, §7.5). The boundary conditions required are continu-
ity of the normal components of D and B at the boundary, and of
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the tangential components of E and H. The continuity condition for
the normal component of B and the tangential component of E are
consequences of Maxwell’s equations. Continuity of the normal com-
ponent of D and of the tangential components of H are equivalent to
the absence of surface charge and surface current, respectively, at the
boundary. In this appendix is provided the proof of these assertions.
This demonstration can be found in many textbooks of electromag-
netism; see, e.g. Jackson (1962): §4.4 for the electric conditions, and
§5.9 for the magnetic.
We assume the macroscopic version of Maxwell’s equations, and
adopt Gaussian units. Maxwell’s equations, in differential form, are,
∇ ·D = 4piρ; (12)
∇×H = 1
c
(
4piJ+
∂D
∂t
)
; (13)
∇ ·B = 0; (14)
∇×E+ 1
c
∂B
∂t
= 0. (15)
For our purpose the integral form of the equations is most convenient.
For (16) and (18), let V be the volume bounded by a closed surface
S, and let dS be nˆ da, where da is a surface element and nˆ is the
outward-pointing unit normal vector. For (17) and (19), let C be a
closed curve, and let S be the surface bounded by this curve, and let
dS = nˆ da, with nˆ a normal to the surface, chosen so that the traversal
of the curve is counterclockwise, when viewed from the side nˆ picks
out as positive. Then we have,∫
S
D · dS = 4pi
∫
V
ρ dV ; (16)∫
C
H · dl = 1
c
∫
S
(
4piJ+
∂D
∂t
)
· dS; (17)∫
S
B · dS = 0; (18)∫
C
E · dl = −1
c
d
dt
∫
S
B · dS. (19)
Consider two regions, 1, and 2, containing a homogenous isotropic
substances, of differing dielectric constants and magnetic susceptibili-
ties. Let S be the boundary surface between them (assumed smooth).
Consider a small region of this surface, sufficiently small that we may
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treat it as planar. Choose coordinates so that the z-axis is normal to
the surface S, pointing from region 1 to region 2.
Consider a region whose “top” and “bottom” consist of surfaces
of area A, parallel to the boundary surface S, with the top within
region 2 and the bottom within region 1. The sides are of length ε,
and intersect S at right angles. Let D2z −D1z be the discontinuity (if
any) of the z-component of D at the boundary.
If we take ε sufficiently small as to be negligible, then the charge
inside our region is σA, where σ is the surface charge density at the
boundary, and the integral of D · dS over the surface of our region is
(D2z −D1z)A. By (16),
(D2z −D1z)A = 4piσA, (20)
or,
(D2z −D1z) = 4piσ. (21)
Another (coordinate-independent) way of putting this is: If nˆ is the
unit normal at the surface,
nˆ · (D2 −D1) = 4piσ. (22)
The discontinuity of the normal component of D at the boundary is
proportional to the surface charge density at the boundary. Using the
same construction, (18) yields continuity of the normal component of
B at the boundary.
nˆ · (B2 −B1) = 0. (23)
Now consider a small oriented closed curve, consisting of a segment
of length L parallel to the surface, and oriented in the x-direction, fol-
lowed by a segment of length ε in the positive z-direction that crosses
the boundary, a segment of length L in the negative x-direction, and a
segment of length ε in the negative z-direction, that closes the curve.
Let K be the surface current density at the boundary. Again, taking
ε to be small enough that contributions from the sides are negligible,
the integral of H ·dl around this loop is (H1x−H2x)L, and the current
through the surface bounded by the loop is −KyL. As the total area
of the surface bounded by the loop can be made arbitrarily small by
taking ε small, the contribution of the displacement-current term to
the right-hand right-hand-side of (17) can also be neglected, and we
have
(H1x −H2x)L = 4pi
c
KyL, (24)
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or,
H1x −H2x = 4pi
c
Ky. (25)
If we now consider a loop with sides oriented in the y-direction, we
get
H1y −H2y = −4pi
c
Kx. (26)
Thus, tangential components of H satisfy,
nˆ× (H2 −H1) = 4pi
c
K, (27)
where nˆ is a unit vector normal to the boundary surface. The same
construction applied to (19) yields continuity of the tangential com-
ponents of E.
nˆ× (E2 −E1) = 0. (28)
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